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I. Introduction
On 6 May 2015, the European Commission launched a sector inquiry into the 
electronic commerce of  consumer goods and digital content in the EU, pursuant to 
Article 17 of  Council Regulation No. 1/2003.1 The e-commerce sector inquiry forms 
part of  the Digital Single Market Strategy adopted on the same day,2 which is built 
on three pillars: (i) a better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and 
services across Europe, which requires the rapid removal of  key differences between 
the online and offline worlds to break down barriers to cross-border online activity; (ii) 
the creation of  the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish, which 
requires fair competition rules and a level playing field; and, finally, (iii) the maximization 
of  the growth potential of  the European digital economy.3
The conclusions of  the Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (based 
on information collected by retailers, marketplaces, price comparison tool providers, 
payment system providers, manufacturers, digital content providers, companies 
offering virtual private networks and IP routing services, and large groups and hosting 
operators),4 clearly show that the growth of  e-commerce over the last decade has been 
undeniable.5 This steady development led to an increased online price transparency and 
price competition but also had a significant impact on companies’ business models and 
consumers’ behaviour. 
From the companies’ point of  view, new market trends and distribution 
strategies have been brought about. A large proportion of  manufacturers decided 
to sell their products directly to consumers through their own online retail shops, 
thereby competing increasingly with their own distributors. Moreover, an increased 
use of  selective distribution systems, where the products can only be sold by pre-
selected authorised sellers, has been registered allowing manufacturers to better control 
their distribution networks, in particular in terms of  the quality of  distribution and 
price. Finally, an increased use of  contractual restrictions to better control product 
1 Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of  16.12.2002 on the implementation of  the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of  the Treaty, in OJ L 1 of  4.1.2003, 1-25. Article 17(1) establishes that 
“[w]here the trend of  trade between Member States, the rigidity of  prices or other circumstances suggest that competition 
may be restricted or distorted within the common market, the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular 
sector of  the economy or into a particular type of  agreements across various sectors. In the course of  that inquiry, 
the Commission may request the undertakings or associations of  undertakings concerned to supply the information 
necessary for giving effect to Articles 81 and 82 of  the Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that 
purpose. The Commission may in particular request the undertakings or associations of  undertakings concerned to 
communicate to it all agreements, decisions and concerted practices. The Commission may publish a report on the results 
of  its inquiry into particular sectors of  the economy or particular types of  agreements across various sectors and invite 
comments from interested parties”.
2 See European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, “A Digital Single Market Strategy 
for Europe”, Brussels, 6.5.2015, COM(2015) 192 final.  
3 Para. 1 of  the Communication.
4 See also, Assonime contribution to the Commission Consultation on the Preliminary Report on the E-Commerce 
Sector Inquiry, 24.12.2016, intervento 20-2016, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://www.
assonime.it/attivita-editoriale/interventi/Pagine/268834.aspx.
5 “Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry”, Brussels, 10 May 2017, COM(2017) 229 final, 
para. 3: “Today the EU is one of  the largest e-commerce markets in the world. The percentage of  people aged between 
16 and 74 that have ordered goods or services over the internet has grown year-on-year from 30% in 2007 to 55% 
in 2016”. See Lars Kjølbye, Alessio Aresu and Sophia Stephanou, “The Commission’s E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry - Analysis of  Legal Issues and Suggested Practical Approach”, Journal of  European 
Competition Law & Practice 6 (2015): 465-476.
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distribution has taken place. Depending on the business model and strategy, such 
restrictions may take various forms, such as pricing restrictions, marketplace (platform) 
bans, restrictions on the use of  price comparison tools and exclusion of  pure online 
players from distribution networks.
Some of  these practices may be justified, for example in order to improve the 
quality of  product distribution. Others, instead, may unduly prevent consumers from 
benefitting from greater product choice and lower prices in e-commerce and therefore, 
warrant Commission action to ensure compliance with EU competition rules. Besides, 
the new strategies brought higher tensions between traditional ‘brick-and-mortar’ 
distributors and online distributors, who can afford more competitive prices in the 
absence of  higher fixed costs related to a physical point of  sale.6
The present paper is intended to analyse how the new digital scenario has affected 
EU competition law and how the EU institutions have reacted in order to face this 
growing phenomenon.
II. EU competition law and the positive effects of  vertical 
agreements on the market
When it comes to fashion industry, the aspects of  EU competition law that are 
mostly relevant can be identified with the provisions on anticompetitive agreements 
set out in Article 101 TFEU,7 in particular with the rules on vertical agreements or 
concerted practices between two or more undertakings. According to Article 1(1)(a) 
and (for the purposes of) Commission Regulation No. 330/2010 (so-called Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation, hereinafter VBER), “vertical agreement means an agreement 
or concerted practice entered into between two or more undertakings each of  which operates, for the 
purposes of  the agreement or the concerted practice, at a different level of  the production or distribution 
chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods 
or services”.8 Besides the agreements between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, 
also those concluded between manufacturers must be considered if  one produces the 
materials that are necessary to assemble the goods that are necessary to the other.
6 On these aspects see Michal Gal, “Competition and innovation in the digital environment”, in 
Concorrenza e comportamenti escludenti nei mercati dell’innovazione, a cura di Giuseppe Colangelo and Valeria 
Falce (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017), 11-26, at 13.
7 According to Article 101(1) TFEU, “[t]he following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of  undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of  competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling 
prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) 
share markets or sources of  supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of  contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of  supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of  such contracts”. On Article 101 TFEU see, ex multis, Allison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 113; Vivien Rose and David Bailey 
(edited by), Bellamy & Child European Union Law of  Competition, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 81; Richard Wish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), 82.
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 of  20.4.2010 on the application of  Article 101(3) 
of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union to categories of  vertical agreements and 
concerted practices, in OJ L 102 of  23.4.2010, 1-7. For a wider analysis of  this Regulation, see Rosa 
Magrí, Le intese verticali. Il regolamento di esenzione UE 330/10 (Catania: Lulu Press Inc., 2013). 
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In the absence of  a specific distinction between horizontal and vertical 
agreements enshrined in Article 101 TFEU, the Court of  Justice of  the European 
Union (hereinafter, CJEU), from the beginning of  the European integration, has 
admitted that this provision prohibits any kind of  anticompetitive agreements 
provided that they have an inter-State dimension, because both can restrict 
competition and create unjustified disadvantages for consumers.9
However, vertical agreements are considered less harmful for the maintenance 
of  a competitive structure than the horizontal ones because, alongside some possible 
anticompetitive restraints, they are recognized to produce also some positive effects. 
It is true that negative effects are also likely to arise from a vertical agreement, like 
the anticompetitive foreclosure of  the market for other suppliers or other buyers 
by raising barriers to entry or expansion; the softening of  competition and/or 
facilitation of  collusion amongst suppliers, often referred to as reduction of  inter-
brand competition; the softening of  competition between the buyer and its competitors 
and/or facilitation of  collusion amongst these competitors, also referred to as 
reduction of  intra-brand competition if  it concerns distributors’ competition on the 
basis of  the brand or product of  the same supplier; the creation of  obstacles to 
market integration, including, above all, limitations on the possibilities for consumers 
to purchase goods or services in any Member State they may choose.10
Nonetheless, they can also produce some possible positive effects as, in 
particular, promoting non-price competition and improved quality of  services (as 
in cases of  selective distribution and franchising that require the distributor to have 
a certain standard of  quality of  the service connected to the image of  the trade 
mark), opening up or entering new markets and promoting investments.11 Several 
reasons may lead to vertical economic and commercial integration: the reduction of  
transaction costs, the need of  an uninterrupted supply of  goods, the reduction of  
taxes, the weakening of  a competitor’s market power and the consequent acquisition 
of  a stronger position in the market. Moreover, these agreements can represent 
an alternative to mergers when they are particularly difficult to implement or can 
turn out to be ineffective. Generally speaking, vertical agreements are aimed at 
making the buyer develop some activities that can be useful but expensive for the 
supplier (principal-agent relationship).12 Every undertaking needs their products to 
be distributed and the quality and efficiency of  the distribution system are pivotal 
factors in the competitive game to gain the favour of  clients. There are only a few 
manufacturers that directly sell to the final consumers, with the choice to rely upon 
specialized distributors being the usual one. In certain fields, strong economies can 
be created thanks to the cooperation of  different operators of  the commercial chain 
9 See judgment of  the Court of  Justice, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission of  the European Economic Community, 13.7.1966, joined cases 56 and 58/64, EU:C:1966:41 
(on Article 86 TEEC). Cp. Enzo Cannizzaro and Lorenzo Federico Pace, Capitolo VI. Le politiche di 
concorrenza, (Torino: Giappichelli, 2010), 293-349, at 300; Richard Wish and David Bailey, Competition 
Law, cited above, 121 (for the difference between vertical agreements and unilateral conduct see 109 ff.).
10 Commission notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, SEC(2010) 411, para. 100.
11 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, cited above, para. 106. See Frank Wijckmans and Filip Tuytschaever, 
Vertical Agreements in EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), para. 9.10; Richard 
Wish and David Bailey, Competition Law, cited above, 629.
12 Philip Marsden and Peter Whelan, “Selective distribution in the age of  online retail”, European 
Competition Law Review 31 (2010): 27. When referred to vertical agreements, the terms «supplier» and 
«buyer» just mean two operators at a different level of  the commercial chain, not being synonyms of  
«retailer» and «final purchaser» respectively.
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and this cooperation has been facilitated and strengthened by the so called “just-in-
time manufacturing”.13
The positive effects generally connected to a vertical agreement must be linked to 
the so-called “rule of  reason”, which means that these agreements must be assessed by 
taking into account not only their object but also their possible effects in light of  the 
economic context in which they are implemented.14 The theoretical starting point is 
that a supplier that, for instance, concludes an exclusive distribution agreement cannot 
be driven by an anticompetitive search of  profits at the expenses of  the buyer since 
the possible price increase deriving from the agreement (besides being forfeited by the 
distributor and not by the supplier) would result in a sales’ contraction. An exclusive 
distribution agreement, that might cause an economic prejudice to the supplier due 
to the consequent price increase, is therefore justified by the possibility that the 
distributor can offer, together with the goods that are the object of  the contract, 
additional services that result in an increase in the quality of  goods and, consequently, 
in demand and profits. This scenario, protecting both the supplier and the distributor 
and bringing higher quality goods to the consumers, is considered far from being 
harmful to competition.
However, in order to assess whether a given vertical agreement brings these 
positive effects also in practice, it would be too simple to look only at the increase in 
the volumes of  products sold since other crucial variables must be taken into account, 
such as the purchasers’ behaviour. It is therefore, necessary to look first at the object 
of  the agreement and, then, at its effects as Article 101 TFEU requires.15 This analysis 
is supported by the VBER listing the conditions under which vertical restraints are 
exempted from the prohibition on anticompetitive agreements defined by Article 
101(1) TFEU, as well as the new Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, both adopted 
by the European Commission on 20 April 2010. These rules replaced Regulation 
13 The “just-in-time manufacturing” (JIT) originally referred to the production of  goods to meet 
customer demand exactly, in time, quality and quantity, whether the customer is the final purchaser of  
the product or another process further along the production line. It has now come to mean producing 
with minimum waste: see T.C.E. Cheng and S. Podolsky, Just-in-Time Manufacturing. An Introduction, 2nd 
ed. (London: Springer, 1996), 9.
14 Pietro Manzini, “Capitolo I. Le intese”, in Il diritto antitrust dell’Unione europea, Bernardo Cortese, 
Fabio Ferraro and Pietro Manzini (Torino: Giappichelli, 2014), 1-43, at 22.
15 On the distinction between restriction by object and by effect see, ex plurimis, Cristophe Lemaire, 
“Object vs. Effect After the Modernisation of  EU Law: What Has (or Should Have) Changed?”, in 
New Frontiers of  Antitrust 2012 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2013), 163-182; Denis Waelbroeck and Donald 
Slater, The Scope of  Object vs Effect Under Article 101 TFEU, in Ten years of  effects-based approach 
in EU competition law. State of  play and perspectives, eds. J. Bourgeois and Denis Waelbroeck (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2013), 131-157; J. Killick and J. Jourdan, Cartes Bancaires: A Revolution or a Remainder of  Old 
Principles We Should Never Have Forgotten?, 2014, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/cartes-bancaires-a-revolution-or-a-reminder-of-old-principles-
we-should-never-have-forgotten; Ginevra Bruzzone and Sara Capozzi, “Restrictions by Object in the 
Case Law of  the Court of  Justice: in search of  a Systematic Approach”, in L’applicazione delle regole di 
concorrenza in Italia e nell’Unione europea. Atti del V Convegno biennale Antitrust, Trento, 16-18 aprile 2015, a 
cura di Gian Antonio Benacchio, Michele Carpagnano (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2015), 217-236; 
Pietro Fattori, “The Impact of Groupement des Cartes Bancaires on Competition Law Enforcement”, 
Italian Antitrust Review, No. 2 (2015): 22-28; Javier Ruiz Calzado and Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, 
“Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission: Shedding Light on What is not a ‘by object’ Restriction of  
Competition”, Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 6 (2015): 495-498; Robert Schütze, European 
Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 701; Gian Luca Zampa and Alessandro Di 
Giò, “The Conundrum of  Restrictions “by Object”: Rationale, Scope, Impact and a Proposal”, Italian 
Antitrust Review, No. 3 (2015): 13-44.
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No. 2790/199916 and the previous Guidelines17 as of  June 2010 and will remain in 
force until May 2022. While the 2010 Regulation does not contain other significant 
changes compared to 1999 Regulation, the new Guidelines contain a great number of  
adjustments and changes to the rules for how vertical restraints need to be assessed, 
from the Commission’s perspective, in light of  Article 101 TFEU. More precisely, 
when the Regulation does not apply because not all the conditions provided there are 
met, it is still possible to assess whether the vertical agreement can enjoy an individual 
exemption. The Guidelines represent the tool that has to be referred to when carrying 
out this evaluation.
III. Vertical agreements within electronic commerce: where the 
EU institutions stand
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, the potential positive effects that 
vertical agreements have on the market led the Commission to admit to the possibility 
of  exempting them, under certain conditions,18 from the prohibition enshrined in 
Article 101(1) TFEU notwithstanding the potential anticompetitive effects based on 
the reduced competition among distributors that they imply. 
The general idea underpinning the VBER and the Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints is that the exemption does not cover vertical agreements that contain 
limitations on passive sales19 for the distributor, whereas limitations on active sales 
can be allowed, provided the other conditions are met. The secondary law provisions 
on vertical agreements are intended to strike a balance between these two interests: in 
fact, on the one hand, allowing limitations of  active sales ensures the supplier that their 
distributors are not going to compete in the same territories or towards the same clients. 
In this way, distributors are also inclined to invest in advertisement and promotional 
activities without running the risk that their direct competitors take advantage of  their 
efforts (so-called free-riding).20 On the other hand, prohibiting limitations on passive 
sales, EU competition law makes it possible to maintain a certain level of  intra-brand 
16 In OJ L 336 of  29.12.1999, 21-25.
17 In OJ C 291 of  13.10.2000, 1-44.
18 There are different sets of  conditions to be met: a market share threshold [the market share held by 
both the supplier and the buyer (distributor) shall not exceed 30% of  their respective relevant markets 
– Article 3 VBER]; the absence of  any restriction of  the buyer’s ability to determine its sale price 
(without prejudice to the possibility of  the supplier to impose a maximum sale price or recommend a 
sale price – Article 4(a) VBER); the absence of  any restriction of  the territory into which, or of  the 
customers to whom, a buyer party to the agreement may sell the contract goods or services, except 
the restriction of  active sales (i.e. the sales deriving from the promotional and client-research activity 
actively implemented by the distributor) into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group 
reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another buyer, where such a restriction does 
not limit sales by the customers of  the buyer, [Article 4(b)(i) VBER and para. 51 of  the Guidelines 
on Vertical Restraints].
19 “‘Passive’ sales mean responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of  goods or services 
to such customers. General advertising or promotion that reaches customers in other distributors’ (exclusive) territories or 
customer groups but which is a reasonable way to reach customers outside those territories or customer groups, for instance 
to reach customers in one’s own territory, are considered passive selling. General advertising or promotion is considered a 
reasonable way to reach such customers if  it would be attractive for the buyer to undertake these investments also if  they 
would not reach customers in other distributors’ (exclusive) territories or customer groups” (para. 51 of  the Guidelines 
on Vertical Restraints).
20 For an analysis of  free-riding concerns in the e-commerce sector, see Ioannis Apostolakis, 
“E-commerce and free rider considerations under Article 101 TFEU”, European Competition Law 
Review 37 (2016): 114-121.
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competition and to compete on price and other market conditions, since (distributors 
are well aware that) consumers tend to go elsewhere, should the retailers increase prices 
or tighten other contractual conditions excessively.
In the internet scenario, therefore, it becomes rather critical to give the correct 
legal definition to some restrictions that are strictly related to the e-commerce sector. If  
these restrictions affect active sales, they will be permitted; not the same if  they affect 
passive sales. 
The European Commission displayed a very favourable attitude towards online 
sales. The internet is considered “a powerful tool to reach a greater number and variety of  
customers than by more traditional sales methods, which explains why certain restrictions on the use of  
the internet are dealt with as (re)sales restrictions. In principle, every distributor must be allowed to use 
the internet to sell products”.21 The Commission thus regards the following as examples of  
hardcore restrictions of  passive selling given the capability of  these restrictions to limit 
the distributor’s access to a greater number and variety of  customers: (a) any agreement 
preventing the distributor from undertaking any kind of  online sales provided that the 
distributor’s decision to use a website to sell products is considered a form of  passive 
selling;22 (b) an agreement that the (exclusive) distributor shall prevent customers 
located in another (exclusive) territory from viewing its website or shall automatically 
re-rout its customers to the manufacturer’s or other (exclusive) distributors’ websites;23 
(c) an agreement that the (exclusive) distributor shall terminate consumers’ transactions 
over the internet once their credit card data reveal an address that is not within the 
distributor’s (exclusive) territory; (d) an agreement that the distributor shall limit its 
proportion of  overall sales made over the internet; however, the supplier may require 
that the buyer sells at least a certain absolute amount (in value or volume) of  the 
products offline to ensure an efficient operation of  its brick and mortar shop;24 (e) an 
agreement that the distributor shall pay a higher price for products intended to be resold 
by the distributor online than for products intended to be resold offline: however, the 
supplier may agree with the buyer a fixed fee (that is, not a variable fee where the sum 
increases with the realised offline turnover as this would amount indirectly to dual 
pricing) to support the latter’s offline or online sales effort.25
In this context, one might wonder whether the growing development of  online 
sales, whose degree was perhaps not completely foreseen by the Commission in 2010, 
broke the above described balance between limitation of  intra-brand competition 
and protection of  price-based competition.26 The increase of  online sales volume is, 
21 Para. 52 of  the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.
22 The same is true if  a customer opts to be kept (automatically) informed by the distributor and it 
leads to a sale. Offering different language options on the website does not, of  itself, change the 
passive character of  such selling (ibidem).
23 This does not exclude an agreement that the distributor’s website shall also offer a number of  links 
to websites of  other distributors and/or the supplier (ibidem).
24 This absolute amount of  required offline sales can be the same for all buyers, or determined 
individually for each buyer on the basis of  objective criteria, such as the buyer’s size in the network or 
its geographic location (ibidem).
25 Ibidem. See Vito Auricchio, Matteo Padellaro and Paolo Tomassi, Gli accordi di distribuzione commerciale 
nel diritto della concorrenza (Padova: CEDAM, 2013), 474.
26 Cp. Josefine Hederström and Luc Peeperkorn, “Vertical Restraints in On-line Sales: Comments on 
Some Recent Developments”, Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 7, No. 1 (2016): 10-23; 
Aldo Frignani and Alessandra Sonnati, “La distribuzione via internet nell’Unione europea prima e 
dopo il Regolamento No. 330/2010: i giudici hanno compreso l’economia di internet?”, Diritto del 
commercio internazionale 30 (2016): 627-650.
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in fact, due to the fact that for a wide range of  goods and services, it is no longer 
necessary for the consumers to go to a physical point of  sale, to be made aware of  
their main characteristics. The consumer, thanks to the knowledge transferred by the 
internet, is totally capable of  finding autonomously the distributor that guarantees the 
most favourable conditions. This makes almost totally ineffective certain exclusive 
distribution agreements or exclusive customer allocation agreements.
Notwithstanding this, the limitation of  passive sales will not, presumably, be 
allowed by the Commission: not only does the online channel guarantee a higher 
volume of  sales, but also, if  the online and offline systems are mutually replaceable, 
this means that neither the limitation of  active sales (done with exclusive distribution 
agreements or exclusive customer allocation agreements), motivated with the aim of  
avoiding free-riding by competitors, finds no real justification. 
IV. Selective distribution agreements and electronic contracts: 
the view of  the CJEU from Pierre Fabre…
Selective distribution agreements represent a very widespread tool within the 
distribution chains.27 As a general rule, there are three possible situations in which 
these agreements are not falling within the prohibition of  Article 101(1) TFEU: either 
they comply with the well-known Metro case law (in this case they would not even 
be considered anticompetitive)28 or they can be exempted under the VBER if  all 
the conditions set therein are met, or, eventually, they can be granted an individual 
exemption.
With the recent and fast-growing increase of  the electronic commerce, a number 
of  new clauses which could be included in selective distribution agreements have been 
developed. This has largely changed the commercial scenario and induced to read the 
typical tools of  competition law under a new lens. These clauses fall, essentially, into 
three general categories:29 (1) clauses restricting the use of  the internet in the context 
of  distribution contracts, whose aim is to eliminate or to limit passive sales; (2) clauses 
restricting the use of  online platforms in the context of  selective distribution contracts; 
(3) parity clauses (or MFNs clauses) which require the supplier from selling through the 
internet to link the terms of  contract arranged with its online platform to the terms 
of  the contracts agreed with the competitors of  the latter. In the perspective of  the 
protection of  competition, these clauses have drawn new problems and recently have 
been the subject of  significant intervention from EU institutions. 
The present analysis focuses on the first two categories of  clauses, which are most 
commonly related to the fashion industry. The first case where the CJEU faced the 
27 According to Article 1(1)(e) VBER, “‘selective distribution system’ means a distribution system where the 
supplier undertakes to sell the contract goods or services, either directly or indirectly, only to distributors selected on 
the basis of  specified criteria and where these distributors undertake not to sell such goods or services to unauthorised 
distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system”. See Joana Whyte, “Direito da 
Concorrência à la Mode”, in Direito da Moda, vol. I, coordenação Ligia Carvalho Abreu, Francisco 
Pereira Coutinho (Lisboa: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2019), 206-208.
28 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice, 25.10.1977, case 26/76, EU:C:1977:167, where the Court stated 
that these agreements comply with the present Article 101(1) TFEU “provided that resellers are chosen on 
the basis of  objective criteria of  a qualitative nature relating to the technical qualifications of  the reseller and his staff  
and the suitability of  his trading premises and that such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers 
and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion” (para. 20).
29 For a general overview of  these clauses see the “Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector 
Inquiry”, Brussels, 15.9.2016, SWD(2016) 312 final.
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issue regarding the first category of  clauses, i.e. contractual clauses that, within selective 
distribution systems, prohibit or limit online sales is the Pierre Fabre case,30 dealing with 
a general and absolute ban on internet sales imposed by the supplier of  cosmetics and 
personal care products on authorised distributors. In this decision, the Court examines 
two different profiles: first whether such a clause represents a restriction to competition; 
secondly, if  so, whether the clause can nonetheless be authorized according to the 
VBER.
As to the first profile, the aim of  maintaining a prestigious image, argued by 
Pierre Fabre, is not considered a legitimate aim for restricting competition and cannot, 
therefore, justify that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim fall outside Article 
101(1) TFEU. A contractual clause requiring sales of  cosmetics and personal care 
products to be made in a physical space where a qualified pharmacist must be present, 
resulting in a ban on the use of  the internet for those sales, amounts to a restriction 
by object where, following an individual and specific examination of  the content and 
objective of  that contractual clause and the legal and economic context of  which it 
forms a part, it is apparent that, having regard to the properties of  the products at 
issue, that clause is not objectively justified.31
As to the second profile, Article 4(c) of  the VBER comes into consideration, 
according to which the restriction of  active or passive sales to end users by members 
of  a selective distribution system operating at the retail level of  trade is considered a 
hardcore restriction. However, the provision authorises the supplier to prevent a member 
of  the system from operating out of  an unauthorised place of  establishment.32 The 
question, then, was if  the internet fell within the definition of  ‘place of  establishment’, 
so that it could be possible for the supplier to ban its use. 
According to the Court, Article 4(c) VBER only concerns outlets where direct 
sales take place. Also, the Court excluded a broad interpretation through which that 
expression can be taken to encompass the place from which internet sales services are 
provided. Therefore, not being possible to invoke that exception, the Court concluded 
that a contractual clause prohibiting de facto the internet as a method of  marketing, at 
the very least has as its object, the restriction of  passive sales to end users wishing to 
purchase online and located outside the physical trading area of  the relevant member of  
the selective distribution system33 (unless such a contract may benefit, on an individual 
basis, from the exception provided for in Article 101(3) TFEU where the conditions 
of  that provision are met).
In the reasoning of  the Court, some passages remain obscure. In particular, 
the Court defined the absolute online sales ban as a restriction by object unless that 
clause is not objectively justified, but it does not make it clear which elements could 
30 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice 11.10.2011, case C-439/09, EU:C:2011:649. See, ex multis, 
Laurence Idot, “Distribution sélective et Internet”, Europe, No. 12 (Décembre, 2011): 471; Jorren 
Knibbe, “Selective Distribution and the ECJ’s Judgment in Pierre Fabre”, European Competition Law 
Review 33 (2012): 450-451; Catherine Robin, “Est-il interdit d’interdire la vente sur Internet des 
produits cosmétiques?”, Revue Lamy de la Concurrence: droit, économie, régulation 67, No. 30 (2012): 23-24; 
Valerio Cosimo Romano, “ECJ Ruling on the Prohibition of  On-line Sales in Selective Distribution 
Networks”, Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice 3 (2012): 345-347; Alexandre L. Dias Pereira, 
“Vertical restraints on internet sales in EU competition law”, European Competition Law Review 38 
(2017): 478-482.
31 Paras. 46-47 of  the Pierre Fabre decision.
32 The wording of  the provision remains unchanged in both the 1999 and the 2010 VBERs.
33 Paras. 54 and 56-57 of  the Pierre Fabre decision.
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objectively justify such a restriction. From the opinion of  Advocate General Mazák, 
the reference seems to be to needs of  consumers’ protection, when he argues “that, 
in certain exceptional circumstances, private voluntary measures limiting the sale of  goods or services 
via the internet could be objectively justified, by reason of  the nature of  those goods or services or the 
customers to whom they are sold”.34
V. … to Coty. Which online passive sales restrictions are allowed?
It is beyond doubt that in the Pierre Fabre ruling, the CJEU stated that the aim 
of  maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition. 
Were this statement to be regarded as a general principle, the conclusion would be that 
not only an absolute ban, but any kind of  contractual clause imposing a restriction 
on internet sales with the aim to preserve the same interest should be deemed as 
anticompetitive.
The CJEU’s subsequent case law proves that this is not the case. In the Coty 
judgment, the Court deals with the issue of  online platform restrictions in selective 
distribution contracts with an innovative approach.35 In this case, the contractual clause 
at stake did not prevent distributors from resorting to the online channel, but from 
making use of  a non-authorised third party in the context of  internet sales.
After recalling that any selective distribution system, limiting competition among 
distributors, leads in practice to anticompetitive restrictions, the Court’s assessment 
focuses on the possibility of  justifying such clause by means of  the Metro criteria.36 In 
doing this, the Court overcomes the firm statement made in Pierre Fabre and establishes 
that selective distribution “may be considered necessary in respect of  luxury goods, since the quality 
of  such goods is not just the result of  their material characteristics, but also of  the allure and prestigious 
image which bestow on them an aura of  luxury, that that aura is essential in that it enables consumers 
to distinguish them from similar goods and, therefore, that an impairment to that aura of  luxury is 
likely to affect the actual quality of  those goods”.37 
This conclusion stems from recalling the case law on trademarks and, in 
particular, the Copad case38. According to this case law, the establishment of  a selective 
distribution system which seeks to ensure that the goods are displayed in sales outlets 
in a manner that enhances their value contributes to the reputation of  the goods at 
issue and therefore to sustaining the aura of  luxury surrounding them.39 It follows 
that, provided that the other criteria enshrined in the Metro case law are also met, a 
34 Opinion of  11.3.2011, para. 35.
35 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice, 6.12.2017, case C-230/16, EU:C:2017:941. See, ex multis, Stefan 
Wartinger and Lukas Solek, “Restrictions of  Third-Party Platforms within Selective Distribution 
Systems”, World Competition 39, No. 2 (2016): 291-305; Andrea Cicala, Kurt Haegmann and Rachel 
Cuff, “From Metro to Coty: a story to be continued? The CJEU’s judgment in Coty Germany GmbH 
v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH”, Italian Antitrust Law Review, No. 2 (2017): 99-111; Ariel Ezrachi, “The 
Ripple Effects of  Online Marketplace Bans”, World Competition 40, No. 1 (2017): 47-63; Maria Casoria 
and Roberto Pardolesi, “La Corte di Giustizia e il (re)wind della distribuzione selettiva nella rete. Il 
caso Coty Germany”, Mercato concorrenza regole 20, No. 2 (2018): 75-88; Giuseppe Colangelo and Valerio 
Torti, “Selective distribution and online marketplace restrictions under EU competition rules after 
Coty Prestige”, European Competition Journal 14 (2018): 81-109; Denis Waelbroeck and Zachariah Davies, 
“Coty, Clarifying Competition Law in the Wake of  Pierre Fabre”, Journal of  European Competition Law & 
Practice 9 (2018): 431-442; Joana Whyte, “Direito da Concorrência à la Mode”, cited above, 213-219.
36 See footnote 29.
37 Para. 25 of  the Coty decision.
38 Judgment of  the Court of  Justice, 23.4.2009, case C-59/08, EU:C:2009:260. 
39 Paras. 27 of  the Coty decision and 29 of  the Copad decision.
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selective distribution system designed, primarily, to preserve the luxury image of  those 
goods is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. More specifically, the Court recognized 
as lawful a contractual clause which prohibits authorised distributors in a selective 
distribution system for luxury goods designed to preserve the luxury image of  those 
goods from using, in a discernible manner, third-party platforms for the internet sale 
of  the contract goods, on condition that that clause has the objective of  preserving 
the luxury image of  those goods, that it is laid down uniformly and not applied in a 
discriminatory fashion, and that it is proportionate in light of  the objective pursued. 
With regards to the appropriateness of  the prohibition at issue in light of  the 
objective pursued, the Court observes, first, that the obligation imposed on authorised 
distributors to sell the contract goods online solely through their own online shops 
and the prohibition on those distributors of  using a different business name, as well 
as the use of  third-party platforms in a discernible manner, provide the supplier with 
a guarantee, from the outset, in the context of  electronic commerce, that those goods 
will be exclusively associated with the authorised distributors.
Second, the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings enables the supplier 
of  luxury goods to check that the goods will be sold online in an environment 
that corresponds to the qualitative conditions that it has agreed with its authorised 
distributors. The internet sale of  luxury goods via platforms which do not belong to 
the selective distribution system for those goods, in the context of  which the supplier 
is unable to check the conditions in which those goods are sold, involves a risk of  
deterioration of  the online presentation of  those goods which is liable to harm their 
luxury image and thus their very character.
Third, given that those platforms constitute a sales channel for goods of  all kinds, 
the fact that luxury goods are not sold via such platforms and that their sale online is 
carried out solely in the online shops of  authorised distributors contributes to that 
luxury image among consumers and thus, to the preservation of  one of  the main 
characteristics of  the goods sought by consumers.40
With regards, instead, to the question of  whether the prohibition at issue goes 
beyond what is necessary for the attainment of  the objective pursued, the Court states 
that, in contrast to the Pierre Fabre case, the clause here at issue does not contain an 
absolute prohibition imposed on authorised distributors to sell the contract goods 
online. Indeed, under that clause, the prohibition applies solely to the internet sale of  
the contract goods via third-party platforms which operate in a discernible manner 
towards consumers,41 also considering that, despite the increasing importance of  third-
party platforms in the marketing of  distributors’ goods, the main distribution channel, 
in the context of  online distribution, is nevertheless constituted by distributors’ own 
online shops, which are operated by over 90% of  the distributors surveyed.42 
The last question was related to the possibility of  applying a block exemption 
should the referring Court find that the Metro criteria are not met in the specific case. 
In this regard, the Court denies that a clause like the one at stake constitutes a hardcore 
restriction. On the basis that it did not prohibit the use of  the internet as a means of  
marketing the contract goods, the judges argue that the clause did represent neither a 
restriction of  customers, within the meaning of  Article 4(b) VBER, nor a restriction 
40 Paras. 44-51 of  the Coty decision.
41 Paras. 52-55 of  the Coty decision.
42 See “Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry”, cited above, para. 39.
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of  passive sales to end users, within the meaning of  Article 4(c) VBER43. In fact, 
under the first profile, it does not appear possible to circumscribe, within the group of  
online purchasers, third-party platform customers. Under the second profile, the clause 
authorised distributors to advertise via the internet on third-party platforms and to use 
online search engines, with the result that customers are usually able to find the online 
offer of  authorised distributors by using such engines.
VI. The Coty outcomes: a real turning point in the EU case law?
The Pierre Fabre and Coty cases appear to establish two opposite principles: for the 
former, the aim of  maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting 
competition; for the latter, on the contrary, it is, provided that the Metro criteria are met.
However, it is worth highlighting that, in reality, the Coty case represents a 
consolidation of  established CJEU case law. The requirement that the characteristics 
of  contracted goods are such as to necessitate a selective distribution system in order 
to preserve their quality and ensure its proper use was a later addition to the criteria 
set out in Metro, explicitly appearing for the first time in L’Oreal.44 The question of  
whether luxury goods were the type of  goods which might satisfy this condition was 
later addressed by the General Court in Yves Saint Laurent45 and Givenchy.46 Expressing 
the same points drawn from Copad, the Court stated that the concept of  characteristics 
of  luxury goods cannot be limited to their material characteristics but also encompasses 
the specific perception that consumers have of  them, in particular their “aura of  
luxury”. The fact that luxury cosmetics are sold through selective distribution systems 
which seek to ensure that they are presented in retail outlets in an enhancing manner 
also contributes to that luxury image and thus, to the preservation of  one of  the main 
characteristics of  the products which consumers seek to purchase.47
There was, thus, a danger that Pierre Fabre could be read as marking a reversal 
of  the legal position concerning the legitimacy of  the preservation of  a luxury or 
prestigious image as an objective for a selective distribution system. The risk was even 
more serious after Pierre Fabre was relied on by the General Court in CEHAR. In the 
context of  a selective repair system for prestigious watches operated by a group of  Swiss 
watch manufacturers, the General Court found that “the aim of  maintaining a prestigious 
image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition”.48 The General Court was bound by 
what, up until Coty, appeared to be an unambiguous statement on the legitimacy of  that 
objective. Despite the Pierre Fabre precedent, the CJEU held that this decision cannot 
lead to the inference of  a statement of  principle according to which the preservation 
of  a luxury image can no longer be such as to justify a restriction of  competition.
The Coty decision is a robust affirmation of  the economics of  selective distribution 
for high-value goods expressed in the previous CJEU case law.49 Maintaining a strong 
brand image requires a chain of  investments leading from pre-production all the 
way to the point of  sale. Selective distribution systems are both a necessary and pro-
43 Paras. 65-67 of  the Coty decision. 
44 See Judgment of  the Court of  Justice, 11.12.1980, case 31/80, EU:C:1980:289.
45 Judgment of  the General Court, 12.12.1996, case T-19/92, EU:T:1996:190.
46 Judgment of  the General Court, 2.12.1996, case T-88/92, EU:T:1996:192.
47 Paras. 6 and 115 of  the Yves Saint Laurent judgment and 6 and 109 of  the Givenchy decision.
48 Judgment of  the General Court, 23.10.2017, case T-712/14, EU:T:2017:748, para. 65.
49 For an economic analysis of  the European Commission’s practice in vertical restriction cases, see 
Jonathan Faull and Ali Nipkay, The EU Law of  Competition, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 1363.
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competitive link in this chain. Besides, the Court reiterated that the Pierre Fabre assertion 
must be read and interpreted in light of  the context of  that judgment50 and according 
to the same Advocate General Wahl, the conclusion that luxury goods may require the 
implementation of  a selective distribution system in order to preserve the quality of  
those goods cannot be called into question by the Pierre Fabre decision.51
Nonetheless, there are other issues that this decision seems to leave open. In the 
first place, one might wonder whether the Coty case law can be applied to agreements 
like the one that characterized the Pierre Fabre case, i.e. an absolute ban on internet sales. 
After Coty, it is left to clarify whether the conclusions enshrined in Pierre Fabre can be 
confirmed or whether maintaining a prestigious image could also justify these more 
restrictive clauses. It appears that it would be very hard for an absolute ban to satisfy 
the proportionality test required by the Metro case. Even though, theoretically speaking, 
it cannot be excluded that the online selling of  some goods or services could negatively 
affect their prestige, the Court based the proportionality of  the Coty clause on the fact 
that it did not contain an absolute prohibition imposed on authorised distributors to 
sell the contract goods online. Coty does not represent a real revirement of  the Pierre Fabre 
case law and appears to confirm that an absolute ban represents a restriction by object 
of  the competition. 
Also, in relation to the applicability of  the VBER, the Coty judgment does not 
seem to overcome the Pierre Fabre decision. In fact, in this regard as well, the fact that 
the Coty clause was not considered a hardcore restriction. Should the ban be absolute, 
also its qualification under Article 4 of  the Regulation could be subject to change. 
The second question left open by the Coty judgment concerns the possibility 
of  applying its conclusions to other categories of  vertical agreements other than the 
selective distribution agreements, e.g. exclusive distribution agreements or exclusive 
customer allocation agreements, when the prohibition of  using third-party platforms 
are aimed at maintaining the prestigious image of  the brand. Considering that the 
Metro criteria are not applicable to these other contractual models, the only way is 
assessing whether they can fall within the scope of  the VBER. The answer should be 
positive, taking into account that the conditions laid out in the Coty case law would be 
met: the clause does not provide an absolute ban; it does not represent a restriction of  
customers either, since it is not possible to circumscribe, within the group of  online 
purchasers, third-party platform customers, nor restriction of  passive sales to end 
users, since the possibility to advertise via the internet on third-party platforms and to 
use online search engines enables customers to find the exclusive distributors’ offers 
by means of  such engines.
VII. The Geo-blocking Regulation: an added value for 
competitive markets
In June 2017, after the Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry was 
released, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation into the distribution 
agreements and practices of  the company Guess to assess whether it illegally restricted 
retailers from selling cross-border to consumers within the EU Single Market. In this 
respect, thanks to the insight gained from the sector inquiry, the Commission was able 
to target EU antitrust enforcement on the most widespread and problematic business 
50 Para. 31 of  the Coty decision.
51 Opinion of  26.7.2017, paras. 74-75.
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practices in e-commerce, which may negatively impact competition and cross-border 
trade, and hence the functioning of  the European Digital Single Market.
Recently, the European Commission has sanctioned the company since Guess’ 
distribution agreements tried to prevent EU consumers from shopping in other 
Member States by blocking retailers from advertising and selling cross-border.52 This 
allowed the company to maintain artificially high retail prices, in particular, in Central 
and Eastern European countries. In a competitive market, on the contrary, consumers 
should be free to purchase from any retailer authorised by a manufacturer, including 
across national borders, in order to find more choice and a better deal. At the same 
time, authorised retailers must be free to offer the products covered by the distribution 
contract online, to advertise and sell them across borders, and to set their resale prices.
On the same grounds, Nike was also fined by the European Commission in March 
2019 for banning traders from selling licensed merchandise to other countries within 
the European Economic Area. This restriction concerned merchandising products of  
some of  Europe’s best-known football clubs and federations, for which Nike held the 
licence.53
These decisions represent a vivid example of  how some selective distribution 
agreements, despite being necessary in the commercialization chain, can be used 
to affect cross-border competition online and offline, by limiting the possibility of  
shopping cross-border. Even though some limitations, if  proportionate, can be allowed 
to pursue certain legitimate aims, some others, like the ones at stake, resulting in geo-
blocking tactics, represent an unlawful restriction of  competition.
In order to face this sort of  anticompetitive behaviour, the restriction of  passive 
online sales, which was already assessed by the Commission in the 2010 Guidelines 
on Vertical Restraints, has been complemented by the adoption of  the Regulation to 
prevent geographic blocking and other forms of  discrimination against customers on 
52 Summary decision, 17.12.2018, case number AT.40428, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40428. In particular, the 
Commission investigation has found that Guess’ distribution agreements restricted authorised retailers 
from: using the Guess brand names and trademarks for the purposes of  online search advertising; 
selling online without a prior specific authorisation by Guess. The company had full discretion for 
this authorisation, which was not based on any specified quality criteria; selling to consumers located 
outside the authorised retailers’ allocated territories; cross-selling among authorised wholesalers 
and retailers; and independently deciding on the retail price at which they sell Guess products. The 
agreements allowed Guess to partition European markets: the Commission has observed that in 
Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) the retail prices of  Guess products are, on 
average, 5-10% higher than in Western Europe.
53 Press release of  25.3.2019, case number AT.40436, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1828_en.htm. The Commission investigation has found that Nike’s non-
exclusive licensing and distribution agreements breached EU competition rules: Nike imposed a number 
of  direct measures restricting out-of-territory sales by licensees, such as clauses explicitly prohibiting 
these sales, obligations to refer orders for out-of-territory sales to Nike and clauses imposing double 
royalties for out-of-territory sales; Nike enforced indirect measures to implement the out-of-territory 
restrictions, for instance threatening licensees with ending their contract if  they sold out-of-territory, 
refusing to supply “official product” holograms if  it feared that sales could be going towards other 
territories in the European Economic Area (EEA), and carrying out audits to ensure compliance with 
the restrictions; Nike included clauses that explicitly prohibited licensees from supplying merchandising 
products to customers, often retailers, who could be selling outside the allocated territories. In addition 
to obliging licensees to pass on these prohibitions in their contracts, Nike would intervene to ensure 
that retailers (e.g. fashion shops, supermarkets, etc.) stopped purchasing products from licensees in other 
EEA territories.
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grounds of  nationality, place of  residence or place of  establishment (so-called Geo-
Blocking Regulation).54 This Regulation, applicable as from 3 December 2018, is one 
of  the main measures adopted within the Digital Single Market Strategy. 
Geo-blocking refers to practices used by online sellers that result in the denial of  
access to websites from other Member States. It also includes situations where access 
to a website is granted, but the customer from abroad is prevented from finalising 
the purchase or being asked to pay with a debit or credit card from a certain country. 
Geo-discrimination also takes place when buying goods and services offline, e.g. when 
a consumer is physically present at the trader’s location but is either prevented from 
accessing a product or service or being offered different conditions.
The Regulation prohibits geo-blocking and other geographically-based restrictions 
which undermine online shopping and cross-border sales by limiting the possibility 
for consumers and businesses to benefit from the advantages of  online commerce. It 
addresses the problem of  (potential) customers not being able to buy goods and services 
from traders located in a different Member State for reasons related to their nationality, 
place of  residence or place of  establishment, hence discriminating against them when 
they try to access the best offers, prices or sales conditions compared to nationals or 
residents of  the traders’ Member State.55 Boosting cross-border e-commerce is one 
of  the main objectives of  the Digital Single Market. Fully harmonised digital contract 
rules and strengthened rules on cooperation between national consumer protection 
authorities will improve consumer protection and conditions for businesses selling 
products and services across borders. The fully harmonised set of  rules on digital 
contracts will reduce the differences between national consumer contract laws and 
remove one of  the main reasons why businesses ‘geo-block’.56
The most important novelty introduced by the Regulation is the direct 
identification of  some situations where a differentiated treatment among clients, on 
geographic grounds, is not objectively justified. 
54 Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  28.2.2018 on 
addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of  discrimination based on customers’ nationality, 
place of  residence or place of  establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations 
(EC) No. 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EU, in OJ L 60I of  2.3.2018, 1-15. 
See Klaudia Majcher, “E-Commerce in the EU: Searching for Coherence of  Data Protection and 
Competition Law in the Context of  Geo-Blocking”, Columbia Journal of  European Law 24 (2018): 577-
595; Valérie Ruotolo and Michela Anna Andreoletti, “I destini incrociati di antitrust e e-commerce: 
dalle iniziative della Commissione europea alla recente sentenza della Corte di giustizia”, Diritto del 
commercio internazionale 32 (2018): 361-384, at 369; Celeste Pesce, “Blocchi geografici ingiustificati”, 
Post AISDUE (2019): 13-25, last accessed 29 April 2019, available at https://www.aisdue.eu/blocchi-
geografici-ingiustificati-unjustified-geo-blocking.
55 According to Article 1(1), in situations not covered by the Geo-blocking Regulation, Article 20(2) 
of  the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) can be applicable. According to this provision, traders may 
only apply differences of  treatment based on nationality or place of  residence if  this is justified by 
objective criteria. In some cases, sector-specific legislation (for instance in the field of  transport, or 
health) may also apply which addresses this issue. In addition, the Regulation leaves the rules of  the 
TFEU unaffected, including its rules on non-discrimination.
56 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on 
the implementation of  the Digital Single Market Strategy, “A Connected Digital Single Market for 
All”, Brussels, 10.5.2017, COM(2017) 228 final, para. 2. According to recital 23 of  the Geo-Blocking 
Regulation, harmonised rules do not imply free cross-border delivery of  goods.
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Very briefly, in a context of  a cross-border transaction,57 Articles 3-5 of  the 
Regulation ban for reasons related to the customer’s nationality, place of  residence 
or place of  establishment, the blocking or limitation of  a customer’s access to the 
trader’s online interface (as well as re-routing without the customer’s prior consent); 
the application of  different general conditions of  access to goods or services; and the 
application of  different conditions for a payment transaction.
These provisions increase price transparency by allowing customers to access 
different national websites. For instance, before the entry into force of  the Regulation, 
if  a Portuguese customer wants to access the Italian site of  an online clothes retailer, 
even though the costumer types in the URL of  the Italian version, she gets redirected 
to the Portuguese version. After the entry into force of  the Regulation such redirection 
will require the explicit consent of  the customer and even if  the customer gives consent 
to the redirection, the original version she sought to visit should remain accessible.
The rules of  the Regulation apply in principle to both business-to-consumer 
(B2C) and to business-to-business (B2B) transactions, to the extent that the latter take 
place on the basis of  general conditions of  access (hence they are not individually 
negotiated) and the transaction is for the sole purpose of  end use (hence made without 
the intention to re-sell, transform, process, rent or subcontract).
Coming to the core question of  the present analysis, which is the coordination 
between the Geo-blocking Regulation and competition rules, this is regulated by Article 
6 of  the Regulation. This Article contains three categories of  provisions.
The first paragraph establishes that, without prejudice to the VBER and Article 
101 TFEU, this Regulation shall not affect agreements restricting passive sales within 
the meaning of  the former Regulation, that concern transactions falling outside the 
scope of  the prohibitions laid down in Articles 3-5 of  this Regulation. This provision, 
despite appearing rather obscure, is substantially aimed at preserving the application 
of  competition rules when agreements limiting passive sales on grounds other than 
nationality, place of  residence or place of  establishment (and therefore falling outside 
the scope of  application of  the Geo-blocking Regulation) are concluded. On the 
contrary, when the agreement falls within the scope of  application of  such Regulation, 
its provisions overlap with competition rules. In this case, being lex specialis, the Geo-
blocking Regulation rules should prevail.58 The Regulation, however, cannot prevail 
over Article 101 TFEU: therefore, despite being very rare in practice, theoretically 
speaking, an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU could not be excluded.
Under the Regulation, a supplier cannot contractually prohibit a retailer from 
responding to unsolicited customer requests in the specific situations covered by the 
Regulation. In the case of  the Guess decision, Guess’ practices that restricted passive 
sales to consumers are now also prohibited by the Geo-blocking Regulation.
In addition, the first paragraph of  Article 6 of  the Geo-blocking Regulation 
specifies that its provisions are inapplicable to agreements limiting active sales. This 
provision is clearer than the previous one and intends to preserve the admissibility the 
restrictions to active sales already allowed, under certain circumstances, by the VBER. 
57 According to Article 1(2), the Regulation does not apply to purely internal situations. Also Recital 
7 states that the Regulation should not apply to situations “where all the relevant elements of  the transaction 
are confined to a single Member State, in particular the nationality, the place of  residence or the place of  establishment 
of  the customer or of  the trader, the place of  execution, the means of  payment used in the transaction or the offer, as 
well as the use of  an online interface”.
58 Pietro Manzini, “Le restrizioni verticali della concorrenza al tempo di internet”, Diritto del commercio 
internazionale 32 (2018): 289-320, at 296; Celeste Pesce, “Blocchi geografici ingiustificati”, cited above, 22.
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If  this was not the case, it would not be possible to conclude exclusive distribution 
agreements or exclusive customer allocation agreements.
Finally, according to the second paragraph of  Article 6, provisions of  agreements 
imposing obligations on traders, in respect of  passive sales, to act in violation of  the 
prohibitions laid down in Articles 3-5 of  the Regulation shall be automatically void. 
Not only does this provision confirm Article 101(2) TFEU, but it also goes beyond 
that. In fact, where an exemption applies, or where contractual restrictions are not 
covered by Article 101 TFEU, there is a risk that they could be used to circumvent 
the provisions of  this Regulation. The relevant provisions of  such agreements should 
therefore, be automatically void where they impose obligations on traders to act in 
breach of  the prohibitions laid down in this Regulation regarding access to online 
interfaces, access to goods or services and payment. Those provisions concern, for 
example, contractual restrictions that prevent a trader from responding to unsolicited 
requests from individual customers for the sale of  goods, without delivery, outside the 
trader’s contractually allocated territory for reasons related to customers’ nationality, 
place of  residence or place of  establishment. Therefore, the importance of  the Geo-
blocking Regulation is strictly related to its complementing competition rules when 
they do not apply to a specific case.59
This is confirmed also in another possible situation. It has to be taken into 
account that e-commerce’s fast development, made possible also by the rules that 
prohibit restrictions on online passive sales, encounters a rather important obstacle 
when the seller decides autonomously (and not on the basis of  contractual clauses like 
selective distribution agreements) not to sell outside a certain territory or a certain 
category of  clients. In these circumstances, in fact, antitrust rules prove to be rather 
ineffective. On the one hand, Article 101 TFEU, implying an agreement between two 
or more companies, cannot be applied; on the other, Article 102 TFEU, applicable also 
to unilateral conducts, presupposes that the company in question holds a dominant 
position, which is not always the case and which is verifiable only with very complex 
economic assessments. 
We are not referring to cases where a supplier or a distributor decides not to sell 
online, such situations constitute decisions on how to conduct a business activity, but 
to cases where they refuse to respond to orders coming from outside a certain territory 
or group of  clients. This kind of  practice is now dealt with by the geo-blocking rules 
that address the issue of  sales restrictions that are at odds with the Single Market.
VIII. Final remarks
In several public speeches, the Commissioner for Competition Vestager has 
underlined the importance of  the digital economy and affirmed that it is still possible 
to “talk today about ‘digital markets’ – still think of  our economy as being divided into parts that are 
digital, and others that aren’t. But that won’t be true for much longer. (…) And very soon, there will 
be no such thing as digital markets – just a digital world”.60 
59 Ben Van Rompuy (editorial), “A Europe without Digital Borders: Beyond the Reach of  Antitrust”, 
European Competition and Regulatory Law Review 1 (2017): 93-95.
60 Speech of  4.4.2019,  Defending competition in a digitised world, Bucharest, last accessed 27.4.2019, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/
defending-competition-digitised-world_en. Similarly in the speech of  8.4.2019, Competitiveness 
in a digital age, Paris, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competitiveness-digital-age_en.
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This statement was made short after the Report on Competition Policy in the 
Digital Age was released.61 The Report makes clear that, despite all the changes that 
digital technology has brought to our markets, the basic principles of  competition 
policy are as relevant as ever. The trouble is that some of  those changes have made it 
harder than ever to keep competition working the way it should. Even earlier, when 
the Preliminary Report on the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry was published in 2016, 
the Commissioner for Competition expressed her hope that that Report worked as a 
“trigger for companies to review their current distribution contracts and bring them in line with EU 
competition rules if  they are not”.62
All these stances make it clear how, in the digital landscape, competition rules, 
that do not per se sufficiently take into account all the new possible restrictions that 
technology enables, need to be read in a such a way that this new scenario does not 
negatively impact markets and consumers.
The case law of  the CJEU is helping in this respect trying to find a fair balance 
between guaranteeing the use of  online channels for distributors and customers and 
protecting some legitimate interest of  the suppliers. Whilst the Pierre Fabre decision 
established that an absolute and general ban of  online sales amounts to a restriction 
by object, the Coty judgment admitted that, under certain conditions, some limitation 
(especially related marketplaces bans) can be accepted.
However, besides the question of  whether the Coty case law can be applied to 
absolute bans and to agreements like exclusive distribution agreements or exclusive 
customer allocation agreements, which are still to be clarified by the case law, other 
critical elements remain unsolved that regard the very conclusion drawn by the Court 
in that decision. Its application, in fact, can become rather subjective when it comes 
to define what is a luxury product and when the need to protect a luxury image arises. 
This assessment involves a certain degree of  discretion, as well as the possibility to 
extend the Coty case law, more generally, to quality products.63 In a context, like the 
European one, where European competition rules are mainly applied by national 
authorities, this margin of  discretion can lead to very different outcomes in the various 
Member States, affecting long-term predictability in contractual relations. For instance, 
the German Federal Supreme Court, in the ASICS case, confirming the position 
opted for a restrictive view by establishing that the Coty case law applies narrowly to 
luxury products and not quality products.64 In the Court’s view, this conclusion was 
61 Final Report by Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Heike Schweitzer, 2019, last accessed 
27.4.2019, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.
62 Speech of  15.9.2016, Competition and the Digital Single Market, Paris, last accessed 27.4.2019, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/
competition-and-digital-single-market_en.
63 In the Competition policy brief of  April 2018, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/publications/cpb/2018/kdak18001enn.pdf, DG Competition has delivered an 
interpretative note on the Coty judgment called “EU competition rules and marketplace bans: Where 
do we stand after the Coty judgment?”, in which argues that the arguments provided by the Court 
in Coty case “are valid irrespective of  the product category concerned (…) and are equally applicable to non-luxury 
products. Whether a platform ban has the object of  restricting the territory into which, or the customers to whom 
the distributor can sell the products or whether it limits the distributor’s passive sales can logically not depend on the 
nature of  the product concerned. In DG Competition’s view, marketplace bans therefore do not amount to a hardcore 
restriction under the VBER irrespective of  product category concerned” (p. 4). In any case, as the note says, these 
conclusions represent the authors’ view on the matter and do not bind the Commission in any way.
64 Bundesgerichtshof, 12.12.17, KVZ 41/17, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://juris.
bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=Aktuell&S
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so stiff  that was not even necessary to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
According to the decision, per se prohibitions (i.e. suppliers’ prohibition to their dealers 
from using price comparison engines) which are not tied to quality requirements are 
illegal. It made reference to both the Pierre Fabre and Coty cases and held the view that 
in contrast to high-priced cosmetic goods,65 sports and running shoes are not luxury 
goods. On the other hand, in a similar case, the Dutch authorities, referring to the 
same Coty case law, drew an opposite conclusion and ruled in favour of  sports goods 
manufacturer Nike in an action against a distributor, which had not complied with 
Nike’s selective distribution policy. The District Court of  Amsterdam found that Nike’s 
selective distribution system, which included a ban on sales via non-authorised online 
platforms, was compatible with competition law as it sought to preserve the luxury 
image of  Nike’s products.66
These issues show how competition law is still finding its way to adapt to the 
new digital scenario. Certainly, the Geo-blocking Regulation has added a new piece to 
the picture and helped to solve some situations that could not be directly connected 
to antitrust provisions. However, new interventions of  the CJEU are much awaited in 
order to bring more clarity to a scenario, like the digital economy, that, despite having 
become a reality in commercial relations, it still does not completely adjust to the 
present competition rules.
ort=12288&nr=80673&pos=25&anz=515. See a note of  the German Competition Authority, “ASICS 
dealers allowed to use price comparison engines - Federal Court of  Justice confirms Bundeskartellamt’s 
decision”, 25.1.2018, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/25_01_2018_Entscheidung_Asics.html.
65 For an some Italian cases applying Coty case law to high-priced cosmetics, see Tribunal of  Milan, 
19.11.2018, case 38739/2018, L’Oreal Italia s.p.a. e Helena Rubinstein Italia s.p.a. v IDS International 
Drugstore Italia s.p.a.; Tribunal of  Milan, 18 December 2018, case 44211/2018, Landoll s.r.l. v Mecs s.r.l. 
See Francesco Banterle, “Two recent decisions on selective distribution and infringement of  luxury 
trademarks from the Court of  Milan”, IP lens blog, 6.2.2019, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at 
https://iplens.org/2019/02/06/two-recent-decisions-on-selective-distribution-and-infringement-of-
luxury-trademarks-from-the-court-of-milan/.
66 See Andrzej Kmiecik, “European Union: Dutch Court Renders Judgment On Legality Of  Nike’s 
Platform Sales Restrictions”, 28.11.2017, last accessed 27.4.2019, available at http://www.mondaq.
com/x/650362/Antitrust+Competition/Dutch+Court+Renders+Judgment+On+Legality+Of+
Nikes+Platform+Sales+Restrictions.
